



Duty governing human actions: to act because it is righteous

SVEN-OLOF YRJÖ COLLIN (PhD, Prof.)

Free University of Scania, Sweden &
Kharkiv University of Humanities 'People's Ukrainian Academy',
Ukraine
Blåtands v. 6,
SE-291 66 Sweden
Tel: + 46 708 204 777
E-mail: SvenCollin@yahoo.com

JEL classification code: D91

Key words: Human motivation, Duty, Selfishness, Belongingness, Weltanschauung

Duty governing human actions: to act because it is righteous

ABSTRACT

It can be claimed that humans have at least three basic instincts: the instincts of selfishness, of belongingness and of duty. Selfishness and belongingness are in focus in economic and sociological studies. Duty has been locked into practical philosophy and, more recently, has been used in organizational justice studies. The paper focuses on duty and explores the instinct of duty by defining it, indicating how it works, and examining its function and origin. This is accomplished by extracting knowledge from a literature review, describing its origin in Kantian moral thinking and extracting some implications of duty, and through case studies analysing the actions of three persons. Duty is found when an individual applies his/her Weltanschauung, containing maxims of action. Duty varies according to the individual, the person with whom the individual is dealing (the 'exchange person'), the situation and the environment.

1. INTRODUCTION

‘So Hans,’ said the chairman, ‘what do you think about the proposal to move the production plant to China?’ The response from Hans was immediate and surprising to everyone at the board table. Hans said, with strong engagement and forceful voice: ‘I totally oppose it. The firm can survive without this, although the production costs will be somewhat higher. To invest in a totalitarian country, lacking any other freedom than to exploit their cheap labour, including absence of free speech, absence of democracy – but the presence of a military willing to kill protesting students – just in order to gain some small percent of profit – is outrageous; it is not right and therefore against my will.’ The chairman was surprised, but realized that the decision could wait until the next board meeting. Hans was among the most important and influential directors, making it hard to force the decision.

After the board meeting, the chairman talked to Hans, trying to change his mind. He said, ‘It is very important for our decision that we are in total agreement. I beg you to think more about the firm’s future development than about your own political standpoints. And you know that you have been recommended for promotion to vice chairman next year, with the accompanying bonus benefits, which will be difficult if you oppose this strategic investment.’ Hans did not hesitate, but gave a quick reply: ‘It is not about politics, it is about doing what is right. I realize that if the firm proceeds with this investment plan, I have to leave the board. That is natural and fair. And I have no trouble with it. You see, when I come down from my bedroom to the first floor in the morning, I see myself in the mirror that hangs right in front of the staircase. I know that I would have to turn my face away every morning if I were to agree to invest in China. And I enjoy my face.’

At the following annual shareholder meeting, Hans retired from the board, with the explanation that he had to focus on other issues for some years to come and that he therefore believed that he couldn’t perform satisfactorily as a director of the corporation. The chairman hailed Hans and his past contributions and expressed regret that Hans had to turn to other issues. At the first board meeting after the shareholder meeting, the board decided unanimously to move the production plant to China.

In this story we find the chairman trying to persuade Hans to conform to the ideas of the rest of the group of directors by appealing to a common sense about what is best for the firm and its development. But without success. The chairman then tries to exploit Hans’s self-interest, urging him to decide in favour of moving the plant with reference to an increase in Hans’s status with a promotion to vice chairman, and an increase in his wealth through the bonus

scheme. But in vain. Hans does not react to the call of the group nor to the call to enhance his wealth and status, since his judgement is directed by a strong personal opinion on which he cannot compromise. Apparently Hans has principles that guide his actions.

These kinds of situations do occur. In management research, however, this kind of conduct is uncommon, if not absent. In research on rational human conduct, two patterns dominate: selfishness and belongingness. Actions based on self-interest can be described as those in which an individual tries to maximize utility, balancing the costs and benefits and choosing the action that best fits with the individual's preferences (Cropanzano, Goldman and Folger, 2005; Miller, 1999). Actions are directed by incentive systems. This explanation of human action resides explicitly in agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It represents the instinct of selfishness.

On the other hand, researchers of groups would claim that Hans would choose the action that made him conform most closely to the norms and interests of the group, in this case the team at the board of directors. This is the instinct of belongingness (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Cremer and Leonardelli, 2003; Gere and MacDonald, 2010). It can be defined as an individual's tendency to be attracted to and want to belong to a group, and to adjust to the norms of the group (Blair and Stout, 2001; Granovetter, 1985), for example, through reciprocity and inequity aversion (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002), through internalizing norms (i.e., becoming socialized), or by acting in ways that are considered to be legitimate. This instinct can have rather simple modern manifestations, such as supporters of a football team, or more advanced and totalitarian systems, with the function of creating a coherent society, such as religion (Graham and Haidt, 2010). The sanction system of the group governs this instinct, where the ultimate sanction is exclusion from the group. This conception resides in theories such as institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).

Both explanations of human action are teleological models of humans, stressing the desired consequence of an action. Selfishness and belongingness have been explained as ultimately evolutionary instincts, drawing on recent developments in evolutionary psychology, which describes them as selected traits that support inclusive fitness and altruism (Boehm, 1997).

We suggest that a theory of rational action has to consider the third alternative, that the individual has a *Weltanschauung* that directs his/her actions. That is the instinct of duty, that a person has to do what a person has to do, no matter the costs and benefits (Blair and Stout, 2001). The action is rational according to Kantian moral philosophy, since it is based on rational practical Reason and because the actions are evaluated according to conformance to the maxims of the *Weltanschauung*. It is a normative action in the sense that it rests on an order that the

individual carries, but it is not defined by a group, but by the individual. Thus, it has to be clearly separated from the instinct of belongingness, where the group, through its ideology, defines the proper actions.

During the last 10 years a deontological model has appeared, assuming duty as a motive for human action. It can be defined as an individual performing an act that is right according to that individual's belief system; in contrast with the other two motives, the act is performed without consideration for its consequences. Duty as a motive resides today mainly in organizational justice theories (Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress and Gee, 2002). The conceptual development of duty as a human motive, and the empirical evaluation and testing in management theory, is still in its infancy.

Based on Kohlberg's moral development theory (Kohlberg, 1973; Kohlberg, 1981; Candee and Kohlberg, 1987) with links to Piaget, it can be claimed that a human being is governed by the instincts of self-interest, belongingness and duty. They are termed instincts because they are not subject to individual choice, but belong to the faculties of humans. They govern our actions, but to my knowledge, how they combine, the factors influencing the strength of each one, and what determines their composition have not been explored scientifically.

The contention and thesis of the paper is that some actions are performed out of duty. The aim of the paper is to contribute to the understanding of human action by exploring duty as a description and as an explanation of human action. The exploration will be centred around three questions: What is duty, where can we find duty and how can we explain duty. The material used have been the writing of Kant, literature on duty that appeared recently and three case studies, two fictional persons and one real.

The paper starts by reviewing the few contributions to the study of duty as an instinct and by discussing Kant's concept of duty. Then I turn to efforts to explain the existence of duty based on an evolutionary perspective. Finally I explore empirical cases of actions performed out of duty in order to arrive at a more elaborated concept of duty. The paper ends with a summary answering our three questions through presenting a more informed conceptualization of duty as a third instinct of humans.

2. SURVEY OF DUTY

Before 2000, the notion of duty in management theory has appeared rather accidental. One study approaching duty was offered as early as 1975, explaining professional organizations as implementers of value-rational action (Satow, 1975). In Sweden, one study (Guillet de Monthoux, 1981) appeared dealing with Kantian normative action in a professional group.

Free University of Scania, Lazy Paper Series 2020:1

Another study (Collin, 1996) analysed the limited liability principle of the joint stock company, and found severe problems with legitimizing it due to fairness. However, these studies did not attract any followers and they fell into oblivion.

A more influential model of normative actions was presented by Etzioni (1988). It has continued into the research areas of business ethics (Victor and Cullen, 1988; Cullen, Parboteeah and Victor, 2003) and corporate social performance (Swanson, 1995), where moral action has been considered in terms of restrictions related to reputation effects in the market (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986a, b), leaving the case of duty unexplored. White (2004) presented a Kantian conception of duty, pushing duty into the economics model of preferences and utilities, but at the price of not being able to offer an answer to the question of why one should be moral (Campbell and Christopher, 1996), and giving up the necessary assumption of the autonomous human who has the freedom to choose to act out of duty. The third motive has been approached in an indirect and descriptive way by the stewardship view (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997), stressing the manager's and the director's fiduciary responsibilities.

The development of duty as the third motive for human action has evolved in a more systematic way over the last 10 years, mainly in the field of organizational justice. Here we find that my basic categorization of three human motives – self-interest, belongingness and duty – are restated with similar terms such as ‘material, relational-identity and deontic’ by Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress and Gee (2002), and as the ‘instrumental, interpersonal and principled’ moral obligations by Cropanzano, Goldman and Folger (2003, 2005).

The development has been localized in the organizational justice area where the theory development has been mainly focused on breaches of norms and how individuals judge other people's actions through a deontic model of justice (Cropanzano, Goldman and Folger, 2003), including fairness theory and equity theory. In fairness theory it is claimed that an individual perceives injustice if a more desirable outcome could have come about. One process studied has been counterfactual thinking (Nicklin, Greenbaum, McNall, Folger and Williams, 2011), where individuals compare a situation with an imagined outcome, worse or better, and judge whether it was fair or not. Equity theory instead takes the individual as its reference point. These studies, however, are more focused on morality per se than on developing a deontic model.

Another characteristic of these studies is that moral action is mainly conceptualized as restrictions on exchange. It has, for example, been claimed that interactional justice is a moderator of the relationship between transaction cost attributes of an exchange and the behaviour in the exchange, such as shirking (Husted and Folger, 2004). Beugré (2010) argued

Free University of Scania, Lazy Paper Series 2020:1

conceptually that deontic agents, that is, individuals acting out of duty, could resist socialization into norms of corruption in organizations.

Experiments have shown that individuals tend to act more in accordance to fairness than self-interest when the other players are identified as persons (Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Greenberg, 2002); that is, moral actions such as those driven by duty can be triggered by the identity of the exchange partner.

Deontic behaviour is a characteristic of the individual, as indeed Kant claimed, since it is a faculty of the autonomous human being. If it is assumed to be an instinct on the same level as selfishness and belongingness, it is always latently available as a motive, but the extent and importance of duty could vary. It has been found that duty varies due to primary socialization and according to the situation at hand. It has been found that individuals differ in moral identity (Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum and Kuenzi, 2012), which now is so well established that it is a building block of the deontic model (Skarlicki and Rupp, 2010).

The individual's history, presumably mainly his/her primary socialization, appears to create variations of duty. It has been found, for example, that Kibbutz children, raised in a highly cooperative culture, are more prone to cooperate than children from middle-class city environments in Israel (Shapira, 1976; Shapira and Madsen, 1969), and that children from Israeli Kibbutzim and from Germany are more cooperative and less competitive in behaviour than Israeli and American city children (Madsen and Shapira, 1977). Although cooperation may be grounded on the instinct of belongingness, it could also be a duty. Greenberg (2002) found that employee theft was lower among individuals of higher moral development who had been exposed to an ethical programme. Thus, it can be concluded that both individual traits and aspects of the situation at hand influence moral behaviour.

It has also been found that moral judgement differs between cultures, as defined by ethnicity, nationality and class (Haidt, Koller and Dias, 1993). Frey, Savage and Torgler (2010) found, after controlling for gender and other possible variables, that the survival rate of North Americans was higher than that of Scandinavians and Englishmen in the *Titanic* catastrophe. This result indicates that the norm of 'women and children first' differed between cultures. It is also conceivable that certain environments, for example those characterized by high uncertainty, select individuals who act according to duty (White, 2004). When, for example, managers at a high organizational level are exposed to high volumes of information and uncertainty, they experience complexity, that is, many factors that are interrelated with each other and with mixing causalities, making it hard to predict outcomes. With a *Weltanschauung*, a simplification of reality is created that provides alternatives of action without demanding evaluation of outcomes

and this makes it possible to act, which then will be actions of duty. Thus, it can be claimed that environment does not remove any instinct, but influences its application.

There are several reasons why it may be argued that an agent of duty is at work in economic environments. One reason draws on Perrow's (1986) notion of human flexibility, asking about the conditions under which an individual will behave according to the instinct of self-interest, belongingness and duty. Experiments have shown that individuals tend to act more in accordance to fairness than self-interest when the other players are identified as persons (Camerer and Thaler, 1995) or when the situation offers the individual opportunity of contemplation and moral conversation (Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang, and Murnighan, 2012). Thus, the situation and environment stimulate certain behaviours. Empirical studies of ethical climates (Victor and Cullen, 1988; Cullen, Parboteeah and Victor, 2003) appear to support this argument. Another reason is that it is conceivable that certain environments, for example those experiencing high uncertainty, select individuals who act according to duty (White, 2004). Thus, behaviour guided by duty could be selected by the environment.

As the review shows, the dominant theme is duty as restraining instead of stimulating behaviour. This development can partly be explained by the dominant empirical set-up in the studies. They are typically conducted in a laboratory environment, most commonly using US business students as respondents, applying resource allocation experiments, where students react to other individuals' behaviour through the distribution of dollars (Skarlicki and Rupp, 2010). We learn from these studies that individuals are prepared to punish what they think is unethical behaviour, even at a cost and even if they have not been injured themselves; and that morality is higher when ethical standards have been highlighted, when the possible victim of theft is an individual and not an organization, and when the individuals have a high moral identity. As Skarlicki and Rupp (2010:949) state, "...our study only shows that the hypothesized effects can happen. An important next step would be to test whether and where these effects do happen" – that is, to go from reactions in a laboratory to actions in reality.

The literature on duty as a driver of human action is scant, but teaches us that:

- *Actions based on duty vary according to the situation and the exchange person.*
- *Actions based on duty vary between individuals and due to primary socialization, i.e., duty could be both an individual and collective trait.*
- *Environmental and organizational forces select individuals with a higher propensity to act in accordance to duty.*

- *Duty can be assumed to be more emphasized at a higher hierarchical level, not only due to selection but also because elements of duty make it possible to act, even when experiencing the extensive flow of information and impressions, and uncertainty characterizing higher hierarchical levels.*

In order to further explore duty I will turn to describing the basic logic of duty, using my interpretation of the Kantian moral idea.

3. KANTIAN DUTY

The human being is heteronomous in the sense that she is influenced by her desire to be happy, to live and to be accepted in a group. These are the driving forces of selfishness and belongingness. The human being, however, is also autonomous, and it is her autonomy that is the subject of Kantian moral teaching (Kant, 2004). She has the ability to act out of freedom, independent of any outside force that prompts her to perform an action. However, freedom cannot be proved, but only indicated as a necessary assumption in order to explain the existence of the moral order. The human being is able to formulate categorical imperatives, which are rules for the will, thus she is free since only those who are free can formulate rules for themselves. Freedom is the capacity to regulate oneself, independent of situation and circumstances.

The human regulation of her own will is the moral law, which is contained in practical Reason, as compared to pure Reason, where the principles of knowledge reside. As an individual, she creates maxims, or her rules of conduct. The morally correct action is not to adhere to maxims, but to confront one's own maxims with the categorical imperative, the ultimate regulation of the free will.

Duty (*Pflicht* in German) is the action performed out of reverence for the maxim that is in accordance to the categorical imperative. It is not obeying the maxim, it is not acting because it is in accordance to a duty where the duty tells one how to act, since then the duty is the cause of the action, and thereby it is not a free act. Duty in the moral sense is not performing due to duty, but out of duty. It is paying respect to a maxim, acting not in accordance to a duty, but because it is a duty. Therefore, duty can be pleasant or unpleasant, but both of these are personal feelings and sentiments arrived at during the act, which are consequences, and therefore without any moral value. Duty is performed because it is right, which is the only reason, the only cause of the act. Through duty the human being manifests herself as a being with practical Reason, vanquishes her biology and her social needs, realizes her freedom and manifests herself as a rational, intelligent being.

This sense of being noble, when only listening to one's Reason, is termed self-worth or self-respect. It should, of course, not be interpreted as an argument of subjectivity and individualism, since Reason is a faculty of all rational, intelligent beings. It is truly universal, not tied to any individual sentiments and transitory feelings, nor to any democratic feelings, trying to satisfy a group or a majority of humans, since moral standards are not subject to voting but to the categorical imperative. Duty is universal, although self-respect is individual.

I suggest that we transpose the idea of one single universal Reason into a system of ideas held in esteem by an individual, which we term *Weltanschauung* (Vidal, 2007). This is a concept that includes both cognition and action since it contains ontology (what is), explanation (where does it come from), prediction (where are we going), axiology (good and bad), praxiology (how to act) and epistemology (what is true) [as developed by Apostel (Vidal, 2007)]. A *Weltanschauung* creates an understanding of reality, categorizes the situation at hand and makes it possible to act according to one of the three instincts and to value the action. It also makes it possible to realize that an individual is not autonomous in an absolute sense, but is in fact bounded to a certain extent, as exemplified by Simon's bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), and even subject to what has been termed 'moral luck' (Velamuri and Dew, 2009).

Transposing practical Reason to *Weltanschauung* is controversial, but space is limited and arguments would divert attention from the exploration of duty. We are confined by the comment that universal Reason runs the risk of being reduced to the liberal contractual conception of the original position, as presented by Rawls (1989), which presents society as devoid of its very basic element, that of conflict.

Summarizing this section, it can be said that

- *Duty is performing an act that follows a maxim that has been evaluated by the individual using the categorical imperative with reference to a Weltanschauung.*
- *Duty manifests the individual as a free, autonomous and rational being (i.e., carrier of practical Reason) with self-respect.*

While we have found some answers on what duty is and where to find duty, we will now focus on how to explain duty. We therefor continue our exploration of duty through turning to an evolutionary and speculative explanation of the existence of duty as an instinct.

4. EXPLAINING DUTY

A thought-provoking explanation of duty is made by Norbert Elias (1991), who claims that duty, or the capacity of self-discipline, has grown in interaction with the productive forces. Human

society has expanded its functional separation, which has led to enormous productivity gains and increasing dependency, especially in the upper classes. In the aftermath of the breakdown of the Roman empire, and the disorganized violent times of the era of the Migration period (*der Völkerwanderung*) and the Viking invasions, a stronger state developed, with stronger tax capacity, and most important, with the capacity to monopolize violence. With the monopoly on violence, individuals felt more secure and could develop skills, make investments at less risk and be engaged in more fruitful trade and production. As relationships and interactions increased in number and intensity, and as dependency increased, humans developed a capacity to control themselves in order to govern the many relationships. No longer able to deal with relationships through violence, humans turned to social sanctions and internalized norms. Or stated differently, when the anxiety in a violent society is reduced due to the state's control of violence, human Reason can develop its capacities and expand its influence on human behaviour through social sanctions (i.e., belongingness) and norms (i.e., duty). Thus, duty as a regulative mechanism, based on Reason, could develop as a mechanism to control human relationships when the opportunities and threats associated with violence disappeared, increasing the possibility of exchange and therefore of specialization. Therefore we would expect to find more duty in societies where unpredictable violence and instability are less likely.

This explanation, however, is a social functional explanation of the development of duty. It assumes the presence of an instinct of duty but does not explain its origin. With inspiration from the use of the evolutionary perspective in business ethics (Velamuri and Dew, 2009), we attempt to apply an evolutionary explanation.

We can speculatively think of at least three explanations of duty: mechanical altruism, selection of leaders and a side effect of social capacity.

The argument of mechanical altruism says that humans have a nepotistic tendency to take care of our genetic relatives (Hamilton 1964a, b). This faculty has been converted into reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), implying that an individual acts according to a rule since the act could support the individual and the individual's group in the future, if it is reciprocated. Thus, humans have gained the capacity to act in accordance to rules that the individual believes is or should be universal, at least for the group.

The argument of selection of leaders claims that duty is more characterized by the leaders of the group than by the other individuals in the group. The individuals of a group can more easily accept being subjected to the power of another individual; they can more readily award someone authority if they believe that the powerful individual is acting purely in the interest of the group. The more an individual is motivated by duty, the more easily his/her

behaviour can be predicted and trusted, and with universal duties supporting the group and not the individual, the more the individual will be preferred as a leader of the group. Thus, duty can be argued to survive as an instinct in human societies since it creates stability in a hierarchical group.

The third possible explanation says that humans have, overall, a social capacity, as indicated by the *Titanic* disaster. The freedom of humans to create norms that can increase the solidarity in a group has been evolutionarily selected compared to humans with less social capacity. The individual has the freedom to invent new norms and to develop old norms in order to adapt to the environment. She is free and creative, and can transcend what appear to be genetic limitations, such as egoism, nepotism and even mechanical altruism, so that she is able to invent new technologies, be they technical or institutional, that can increase the survival rate of the genes but not necessarily of the individual. The freedom of humans, as Kant assumed but could not prove, may be selected by nature as a faculty of humans that gives them a higher survival rate than those governed by mere instincts. The extreme manifestation of this selected freedom is the capacity to perform due to duty. Thus, duty is not what enables survival, but is an effect of the characteristic that causes survival, the freedom of the human. The free, rational and creative individual has a strong adaptive capacity since she has the freedom to create norms, that is, she has the very capacity of social construction to create norms, with the side effect of being able to create norms not only for social groups, but norms per se.

To summarize, we suggest that

- *Duty can be expected to be more frequent in stable, non-violent societies.*
- *Duty could be explained by a.) a mechanical transfer of nepotism into altruism; b.) a result of leadership selection where humans with a greater tendency towards duty are selected since they are more predictable and less egoistic, and they work more for the group or universal principles and c.) duty could be an effect of human capacity for social construction, where duty does not enable survival, but is an effect of the freedom of humans that cause survival.*

5. THREE CASES OF DUTY

In order to continue our exploration of duty we will now inspect and analyse actions of duty through three distinguished cases. These are the actions of Alceste, Jane Eyre and Adolf Eichmann. Since individuals are the actors of duty, it is reasonable to study individuals. I chose two fictitious characters, Alceste and Jane Eyre, since they are created as principle actors with the

capacity to indicate what duty is and where it resides, and to a certain extent, its consequences. Other cases could have been selected, such as Dr Stockmann, in *The Enemy of the People* by Ibsen, Don Quijote by Cervantes or Prince Lev Nikolaevich Myshkin in *The Idiot* by Dostoyevsky. The selection criteria I have applied are that one person has to be from drama since these persons are presented more realistically, and one from comedy, where the principle is expressed in its extreme form. The third person, Eichmann, is a real person, which is included in order to find a contrast between submission and duty, since duty could be interpreted as representing submission and obeying of principles. Our three persons will, as all case studies, be used in order to enlighten our earlier arguments and to create new hypotheses.

5.1 The Misanthrope Alceste

Molière (1988) wrote and published the play *‘Le Misanthrope ou l’Atrabilaire amoureux’* (i.e., *The Misanthrope*) in 1666. It is a play about the truth-loving Alceste and the intermezzos that his principle of truth creates – for his loved ones and for his environment. At that time, as indeed in our time, the drawing rooms were filled with flattery and fawning, combined with slander and whispering voices. It was a time of smooth and easy manners. Alceste is deeply in love with Célimène, who has a very flexible manner towards the people of the drawing rooms. That smoothness is shared by Alceste’s best friend, Philinte, who claims: “But when we are of the world, we must conform to the outward civilities which custom demands.” Alceste opposes such ingratiating behaviour since he has to tell the truth. It is not a choice of his own, but a duty he has to fulfil: “I like a man to be a man, and to show on all occasions the bottom of his heart in his discourse.” And he is prepared to take it to its end, so he makes the statement that creates the title of the play: “I become quite melancholy and deeply grieved to see men behave to each other as they do. Everywhere I find nothing but base flattery, injustice, self-interest, deceit, roguery. I cannot bear it any longer; I am furious; and my intention is to break with all mankind.” Above and beyond all pleasures and all rewards that are given to the socially easy man is his fight for truth, which makes Molière describe Alceste’s passion as a fight against humanity.

The play was launched as a comedy, and the main comic events in the play are created by the contrast between Alceste’s socially uneasy passion for truth and the other characters’ smiles, laughter and pleasant manners. Philinte, Alceste’s loyal friend, makes this observation: “... that all those invectives against the manners of the age, make you a laughing stock to many people.”

Free University of Scania, Lazy Paper Series 2020:1

The truth claimed by Alceste throws him into a legal trail, which he loses. At the same time Célimène declares her love to Alceste, which he surprisingly turns down. The comedy ends abruptly, probably with Alceste escaping from both the legal trail and the love affair.

Maybe Molière is giving us some hope here. Passion for truth creates problems, but that is just how it seems since Alceste, when he gets the love he wanted so much, runs off. Only Alceste can carry the real truth, he believes. When someone else openly and without calculation declares something of truth, his monopoly on being the principle of truth is broken. Then his distinctive character in the play is gone, his identity is eroding and so he disappears. At the end, it appears that the socially smooth Célimène can represent truth by her love, but Alceste appears to use his principle of truth, the duty, only as a social marker. Thus, at the end, it appears that Alceste is like the others, only with a different marker. That is why the play ends with a hope expressed by Philinte: “Come, Madam, let us leave nothing untried to deter him from the design on which his heart is set.”

The passion for the truth appears throughout the play, except at the very end, to be without any consideration of the consequences. For that reason we can consider Alceste a man of duty in the drawing-room society of calculations and consequences. While the others assume and follow the time and its conventions, Alceste follows his obligation, the duty to speak the truth. Certainly everyone realizes the truth, since without the truth there would be no slander and no backbiting, but everyone also realizes that a lie can be a good instrument with which to achieve social unity. They use self-interest for their own profit and belongingness for the benefit of social harmony. For most of the characters in the play, duty may be uncomfortable, but above all, it is devastating. The duty to tell the truth does not carry anything good with it, and therefore it is not desirable.

If we leave the internal drama and see the play as a comedy, driven by Alceste’s duty to tell the truth, we realize that duty can easily be ridiculed. It is not really the duty to tell the truth that is ridiculous. It is the act of the duty that carries the laughs. It is the rigid action, to never consider the consequences, to never adapt to the situation, to never calculate the costs and benefits of an action. The comedy arrives because Alceste always acts, never reacts. It is his passion for the truth, the very duty that creates his actions. Never is an act created by calculation and consideration. It is de-ontologically rational, but certainly not consequence rational.

We can also note that Alceste has a loyal assistant, Philinte, who takes care of him and helps him because, due to his duty, Alceste cannot cope with the world, and the world cannot cope with him. Philinte stands by Alceste’s side as a social calculator and informant about social

customs, giving him advice about the consequences of actions. Philinte is the one considering reactions, not actions.

The Kantian a priori we get here is a misanthrope aloof in the world. The misanthrope acts without any consideration of the situation, and without any eye on the consequences for anyone, including the actor. The a priori appears to be out of touch with reality. A person led by duty in the world of drama appears so much a priori that he needs a posteriori, without any egoism, to be the calculator. Both of these functions, to be a posteriori and to be a calculator who, through his experience, can determine reactions that can profit the individual, is the part played by Philinte. These two functions, performed in the shadow of a man of duty, we recognize in the play *Don Quixote* (Cervantes, 2001), where Sancho Panza makes it possible for Don Quixote to survive through all his missions of chivalry. Another striking similarity between the play and the novel is that the authors let the two men of duty convert to what is considered as more sane conditions at the end, but at a price – for Alceste it is to flee, and for Don Quixote it is to die of melancholy. Cervantes and Molière are here only telling us what we always have to remember, that humans are complex individuals, and when we stress only one aspect of humans we get good laughs in comedies, tears in dramas, and theoretical explanations in science. Those who claim that they offer a theory of “...human nature as we know it...” (Knight, 1965; Williamson, 1996), are making the same comical mistake as Don Quixote did, mixing what is in imaginative stories with concrete reality.

5.2 Jane Eyre

Jane Eyre was an orphan who, in her youth attended a boarding school characterized by rough and hard discipline, which she objected to. As a small child she revolted against the lady who had taken care of her and given her shelter. What the lady considered to be a home, Jane objected to.

On one occasion in the novel young Jane is asked to leave the room after a dramatic scene. Jane refuses and says: “*Speak* I must:...” (Brontë 1994:38, italics by the author). She then tells her mistress that she dislikes her, that she will never look at her with love and compassion. The mistress then says very harshly: “How dare you affirm that, Jane Eyre?” (Brontë 1994:38). And Jane responds promptly: “How dare I, Mrs Reed? How dare I? Because it is the *truth*” (Brontë 1994:38, Italics by author).

Jane is similar to Alceste, a person without any inclination to engage in social small talk. When, later in the novel, she is asked to entertain her employer by conversing with him, she sits silent and thinks: “If he expects me to talk for the mere sake of talking and showing off, he

Free University of Scania, Lazy Paper Series 2020:1

will find he has addressed himself to the wrong person..." (Brontë 1994:134). But when it concerned the truth, things that had to be said, she could speak, loud and clear. Her passion for telling the truth without looking at the consequences, without any sense of choosing the socially correct moment, created an intolerable situation, which is why she was sent to the boarding school.

But Jane does not regard telling the truth as a mistake, as a failure. On the contrary, she appears to experience the Kantian freedom, an elevating, relieving and tonic freedom: "Ere I had finished this reply, my soul began to expand, to exult, with the strangest sense of freedom, of triumph, I ever felt" (Brontë 1994:39). She made the choice of telling the truth, without looking at the consequences, because she had to speak. That is when she first experienced freedom, the freedom that made her speech possible. Consequently, the most rigorous duty, with the most devastating material consequences for the one performing the duty, created the sense of freedom, in accordance with the Kantian concept.

In the novel's dramatic climax, Jane approaches the altar to marry Mr. Rochester, the man whose stepdaughter she has been teaching. But there is a grave impediment, the fact that Rochester is already married, although it is an unhappy marriage which he was tricked into years ago. Still, it is a marriage. Rochester pleads with Jane to disregard the marriage and begs her to be practical. He was tricked into marrying an insane woman, who now lives separated from all humans, locked into one of the wings of the manor. Practically speaking, he regards himself as unmarried: "Is it better to drive a fellow creature to despair than to transgress a mere human law, no man being injured by the breach? – for you have neither relatives nor acquaintances whom you need fear to offend by living with me" (Brontë 1994:313). Rochester refers both to the consequences for himself, that he would be disconsolate if she were to follow a simple law, and to the lack of consequences for Jane, in that breaking the law would harm no one, least of all Jane since she has no relatives who would object. He uses here a reference to altruism, to making an act of belongingness, since there is no break of belongingness related to his formal marriage because his current wife is insane and he was tricked into the marriage. Concerns about bigamy are therefore irrelevant. He refers to both his self-interest and Jane's self-interest, and to the altruistic action of choosing to live with him, even if he is formally married to someone else.

Jane is close to giving in, and in the novel we get a very dramatic story about the conflict in her soul. She tries to overcome the conflict by telling herself that she can give in, since it would be good for Rochester, and good for love, and she asks herself: "Who in the world cares for *you*? or who will be injured by what you do?" (Brontë 1994:314, italics by the author).

Free University of Scania, Lazy Paper Series 2020:1

Her response is fast and sharp: “Still indomitable was the reply: *I care for myself. The more solitary, the more friendless, the more unsustained I am, the more I will respect myself. I will keep the law given by God; sanctioned by man. I will hold the principles received by me when I was sane, and not mad – as I am now. Laws and principles are not for times when there is no temptation; they are for such moments as this, when body and soul rise in mutiny against their rigour; stringent are they; inviolate they shall be. If at my individual convenience I might break them, what would be their worth? They have a worth – so I have always believed; and if I cannot believe it now, it is because I am insane – quite insane, with my veins running fire, and my heart beating faster than I can count its throbs. Preconceived opinions, foregone determinations are all I have at this hour to stand by; there I plant my foot*” (Brontë 1994:314, italics by author).

This is a lengthy and strong speech about the Kantian duty, to act in accordance to one’s principles, especially when such actions are hard to perform, when the costs, even the individual costs, are significant, and without letting the emotions and the soul interfere and influence the action. As Jane says, the values of principles are revealed when they are hard to obey. She says also in the introduction to the citation that it is certainly about obeying the laws given by God and sanctioned by man, but above that, it is about obeying those laws because she chooses to, and she does it for her own sake. She is a solitary being in the world who acts according to the principles she has chosen. Without any consideration for the consequences, individual or social, she performs her duty, she follows and acts in accordance to her principles. She does it for her own sake, because she cares about herself as a solitary being, as an autonomous subject. It has nothing to do with social respect, gained through belongingness. It is absolutely not about satisfying egoistic inclinations, such as gaining happiness through love. It is about respecting oneself, about self-respect, which the duty creates.

Even though all of this indicates a strong sense of duty, there is a small indication that Jane is also acting out of a feeling of self-interest. The man she almost married had had many mistresses, to silence his sorrow, but now he talks disparagingly about them. Jane states: “... if I were so far to forget myself and all the teaching that had ever been instilled into me, as – under any pretext – with any justification – through any temptation – to become the successor of these poor girls, he would one day regard me with the same feeling which now in his mind desecrated their memory” (Brontë 1994:309). If she were to give in to her heart, then she would not only have deceived herself and all her principles, but she would also, sooner or later, be deceived by Rochester who will despise her for not remaining firm in being Jane Eyre. Thus, there are many references to duty, but also to the contempt Rochester would have for her in the future should

Free University of Scania, Lazy Paper Series 2020:1

she give in. So, for herself and for him, Jane is firm in her obedience to her duty, but there are also some aspects of self-interest in her decision.

Early one morning Jane Eyre leaves the manor, still fighting against her self-interest and altruistic drives which are trying to get her back to the manor and to Rochester. The continuation of the novel is left for the reader to enjoy. We are satisfied with the notion that Jane Eyre has shown the essence of the message by Kant, that if one does one's duty one experiences freedom and self-respect. Certainly, Jane makes reference to the Bible and to human law, but these principles do not select her; she selects them, thus it is an act of freedom. Jane follows no commands, no orders, but her own principles, without looking at the consequences, other than self-respect. Without self-respect she would have been nothing, even if she had been wed to the man she loves.

This raises a complication in the teaching on duty. Is it the case that duty, in the end, is about self-respect – that is, is it very individualistic? Although the doctrine says that one should act in such a way that it can be a universal law for all creatures of Reason, that it, it is supra-individual, including not only all humans, but all creatures with Reason, it appears to assume that individuals of duty are seeking self-respect.

One solution to this complication, where the individual appears to be collectivistic, is that Reason is one, that Reason is not individual but collective. Reason belongs to everyone; the only variance is the person's ability to use Reason. With only one Reason, but many different capacities to apply Reason, we can infer that Reason carried by one human can arrive at a principle that can be made into a universal law. This is one possible solution, based on the idea that Kant created all the a priori categories, which were categories carried by everyone. It is quite conceivable that humans have similar moral categories that make it possible to arrive at universal laws.

5.3 Adolf Eichmann

Duty is similar to love in the sense that it is blind. Duty is governed by the will to act in accordance to a principle, without regard to consequences. Duty is blind to consequences since it is not led by affections, consequences or utility, but by principle. This makes duty vulnerable to criticism that it is indifferent to effects of actions. This was brought to a head at the Nuremberg trials, where defendants claimed that they had only been performing their duty (Tusa and Tusa, 2010).

Adolf Eichmann used duty as his defence and claimed in the Jerusalem trial of 1960, according to Hannah Arendt (1996), that he lived according to the moral teachings of Kant,

Free University of Scania, Lazy Paper Series 2020:1

especially the categorical imperative. His sense of duty was so strong that he felt uncomfortable when he, due to family reasons, was diverted from his duty. He helped a half-Jewish cousin and a Jewish couple because his uncle had asked him to. He appeared to be more troubled by the fact that they had escaped the Holocaust due to his break from duty than he was by the millions who were killed. Thus, the voice of conscience is strong for those who act in accordance to duty.

Eichmann claimed that Kant stopped being a guide when he got the order of Holocaust. His argument was that the Holocaust was not in accordance to his will, but that he had to obey the order. Thus, he accepted to become a mean of the Nazis, and not use his Reason, breaching the two requisites for Kantian moral duty.

This way of acting, obeying what they called duty, was cited by the Nazis in the Nuremberg trials. That is, however, seeking justification in an old myth. Abraham took his son and put him on the sacrificial altar and raised his knife in order to obey the demand of his god, Yahweh, that he kill his son. He accepted to become a mean of Yahweh, and he did not use his Reason in deciding whether this was an acceptable act. He just obeyed. The moral content, the moral responsibility would therefore be transported from Abraham, the tool, to Yahweh the actor. Abraham and Eichmann were but simple tools for Yahweh and the Führer.

Submission, however, is not duty. As Hanna Arendt correctly remarks, duty is based on practical Reason, not on someone else's will. The Kantian categorical imperative would ask if you could accept as a universal principle that humans should abandon their Reason and their autonomy and surrender to someone else's will. The answer is that to do so is to abdicate from your freedom, which is a basic characteristic of humans. Thus, you cannot escape your freedom, as the existentialist is teaching us, since such an escape would be but a manifestation of your freedom. This becomes a contradiction, and therefore cannot be made a universal principle.

Duty is based on practical Reason, not on the laws of the state or on any will of any God or Führer. As we noted earlier, duty cannot even be based on the actor's wish to become happy (i.e., self-interest), or to belong to a group (i.e., belongingness). Duty can only be based on the wish to act according to a principle that can be made a general principle. That principle can never encompass the will to abdicate as a free human since it is only a free human who can act out of duty. Thus, Abraham is morally guilty of attempted murder, and Eichmann is guilty of assistance to murder.

Obedience towards a God or a Führer is in the Kantian morality replaced with Reason, which everyone carries and has a responsibility to use. What is revolutionary in his doctrine is that he makes these mystic Beings unemployed.

Free University of Scania, Lazy Paper Series 2020:1

If this is correct, the consequences are dramatic since it implies that if I can show that a law is not in accordance to Reason, then I have no obligation or duty to follow that law, since it cannot be made a general principle. Thus, it is an invitation to social insubordination. But it is also an invitation to free speech, making it possible to present all versions of principles that compete to be general principles.

The example of Eichmann shows that duty cannot be used as an excuse for obedience. Duty is not blind submission; on the contrary, it is a manifestation of freedom and Reason. Duty could, to be sure, be experienced as a burden since it implies action without any thought of attaining individual happiness. But duty is an expression of the freedom of the individual since it is chosen by the individual. Duty is imperative for the action, but not for the individual, since it is the individual who has made the choice of the maxim, or the principle.

One should therefore be attentive when someone claims to be acting out of duty. To be sure, it is an act of compulsion in the concrete situation since the individual has to perform the act and has to disregard the consequences. But at the same time, the individual has to be proud, as indeed Jane Eyre was, since the act is an expression of the freedom of the individual who can proudly perform in accordance to a freely selected principle. Thus, duty can never be used as an excuse, as an expression of coercion, and thereby cannot declare an individual to be without responsibility. Nothing can be more wrong. Duty is a manifestation of a free individual who is using her practical Reason.

These three cases show in different ways the essence of duty. In particular, we have found that:

- *Lacking capacity to temper duty, an actor of duty needs intermediaries that mediate between the acting actor of duty and the reacting actors.*
- *Acts of duty create feelings of freedom and create self-respect.*
- *Duty implies social insubordination.*
- *Duty is not obedience, when a person becomes an instrument, but implies full individual accountability.*

6. SUMMARY

Our exploration makes it possible to superficially describe and explain the human faculty to perform acts according to duty. We have found some answers to three questions:

What is duty? Duty is a human faculty to act in accordance to what is considered to be right. The situation is interpreted and the action is evaluated using a *Weltanschauung*, which contains cognitive elements (i.e., ontological and epistemological elements) and praxis elements. These

elements make it possible for the actor to understand the situation and to reach a conclusion about a proper action. The proper action implements a maxim, which has been evaluated using the categorical imperative. An act of duty manifests the individual as a free, autonomous, rational and intelligent being (i.e., carrier of practical Reason) with self-respect. Duty is not obedience since obedience reduces the individual to an instrument. On the contrary, it implies full individual accountability and even social insubordination.

Where is duty found? Actions based on duty vary according to the situation and exchange person. They also vary between individuals and due to primary socialization; that is, duty may be both an individual and collective trait. Duty can be expected to be more frequent in stable, non-violent societies and it can be assumed that environmental and organizational forces select individuals with a higher propensity to act in accordance to duty. This selection is emphasized on a higher hierarchical level because elements of duty make it possible to act, even when experiencing the extensive flow of information and impressions, and uncertainty characterizing higher hierarchical levels. However, an actor who lacks the capacity to temper duty appears to need intermediaries that mediate between the acting actor of duty and the reacting actors.

How can duty be explained? It could be (A) a mechanical transfer of nepotism into altruism; or (B) a result of leadership selection where humans with a greater tendency towards duty are selected because they are more predictable and less egoistic and work more for the group or universal principles; or (C) duty could be an effect of the human capacity for social construction, where duty does not cause survival, but is an effect of the freedom of humans that causes survival.

Concluding the paper, duty has been presented as a reasonable category of human action, if not an instinct of humans, using evolutionary arguments to support the thesis. Scientific and art studies have been used to indicate the presence of duty, and testable hypotheses have been offered. It can be claimed that management science can include actions due to duty in the arsenal of explanations. But, in order to avoid comedies such as the one produced by Molière's *Alceste*, which indicated that a human without the faculty to choose between the three human instincts becomes a laughing stock, "...close to being a social moron" (Sen, 1977:336), as Sen claims the economic man to be, we have to avoid hegemony of any human instinct since humans appear to be able to choose the driver of the logic of their actions. Avoidance of the comedy of one-sidedness, however, raises a theoretical challenge, that of creating a meta-theory of instincts, resembling meta-ranking ("...rankings of preference rankings..."[p.337]) as proposed by Sen (1977), where we are able to predict a human's propensity to use one of the three instincts. In

Free University of Scania, Lazy Paper Series 2020:1

our introductory example, Hans made the choice to adhere to duty, not to belongingness or selfishness. We still need to explain Hans's choice of acting in accordance to his duty instead of increasing his wealth or his status. Maybe we have to look for the will of instincts in the Humeian emotional will, in Schopenhauer's interest in the will or in our tendency to use heuristics (Sunstein, 2005) or to act morphologically rational (Horgan and Timmons, 2007). These are, however, questions for future research to deal with. We are still in the infancy of exploring the third instinct, duty, of which this paper has been but one small piece.

REFERENCES

- Arendt, H. (1996) *Den banala ondskan: Eichmann i Jerusalem*, (Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil), Göteborg:Daidalos.
- Baumeister, R. F. and Leary, M. R. (1995) The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation, *Psychological Bulletin*, 117(3):497-529.
- Beugré, C. D. (2010) Resistance to socialization into organizational corruption: A model of deontic justice, *Journal of Business and Psychology*, 25:533-541.
- Blair, M. M. and Stout, L. A. (2001) Director accountability and the mediating role of the corporate board, *Washington University Law Quarterly*, 79:403-447.
- Boehm, C. (1997) Impact of the human egalitarian syndrome on Darwinian selection mechanics, *The American Naturalist*, Vol. 150, No. S1, Multilevel Selection: A Symposium Organized by David Sloan Wilson (July), pp. 100-121.
- Brontë, C. (1994). *Jane Eyre*, London: Penguin Books.
- Camerer, C. and Thaler, R. H. (1995) Anomalies: Ultimatums, dictators and manners, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(2):209-219.
- Campbell, R. L. and Christopher, J. C. (1996) Moral development theory: A critique of its Kantian presuppositions, *Development Review*, 16:1-47.
- Candee, D. and Kohlberg, L. (1987) Moral judgment and moral action: A reanalysis of Haan, Smith, and Block's (1968) free speech movement data, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52(3):554-564.
- Cervantes Saavedra, M. de (2001) *Den snillrike riddaren Don Quijote av la Mancha* (El ingenioso hidalgo Don Qvixote de la Mancha & Segvnda parte del ingenioso cavallero Don Qvixote de la Mancha), Stehag: Symposion.
- Collin, S.-O. 1996. Bad losers - An investigation of the morality of the limited liability of the shareholders in a joint stock company, *Journal of Economic Issues*, 30(1):283-289.
- Cremer, D. D. and Leonardelli, G. (2003) Cooperation in social dilemmas and the need to belong: The moderating effect of group size, *Group Dynamics*, 7(2):168-174.
- Cropanzano, R., Goldman, B. and Folger, R. (2003) Deontic justice: The role of moral principles in workplace fairness, *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 24(8):1019-1024.
- Cropanzano, R., Goldman, B. and Folger, R. (2005) Self-interest: Defining and understanding a human motive, *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 26:985-991.
- Cullen, J. B., Parboteeah, K. P. and Victor, B. (2003) The effects of ethical climates on organizational commitment: A two-study analysis, *Journal of Business Ethics*, 46: 127-141.
- Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. and Donaldson, L. (1997) Toward a stewardship theory of management, *Academy of Management Review*, 22: 20-47.
- DiMaggio P. J. and Powell, W.W. (1991) Introduction. In: Powell W.W. and DiMaggio P.J., editors. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 1-40.
- Elias, N. (1991) *Från svärdet till plikten: Samhällets förvandlingar (Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation - Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen)*, Stockholm:Atlantis.
- Etzioni, A. (1988) *The moral dimension: Towards a new economics*, New York: Free Press.
- Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2002) Why social preferences matter – the impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives, *The Economic Journal*, 112(march):1-33.
- Frey, B. S., Savage, D. A. and Torgler, B. (2010) Noblesse oblige? Determinants of survival in a life-and-death situation, *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 74:1-11.

- Gere, J. and MacDonald, G. (2010) An update of the empirical case for the need to belong, *The Journal of Individual Psychology*, 66(1): 93-115.
- Graham, J. and Haidt, J. (2010) Beyond beliefs: Religions bind individuals into moral communities, *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14(1):140-150.
- Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness, *American Journal of Sociology*, 91, 481-510.
- Greenberg, J. (2002) Who stole the money, and when? Individual and situational determinants of employee theft, *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 89:985-1003.
- Guillet de Monthoux, P. (1981) *Doktor Kant och den oekonomiska rationaliseringen*, Göteborg: Korpen.
- Gunia, B. C., Wang, L., Huang, L., Wang, J. and Murnighan, J. K. (2012) Contemplation and conversation: Subtle influences on moral decision making, *Academy of Management Journal*, 55(1): 13-33.
- Haidt, J., Koller, S. H. and Dias, M. G. (1993) Affect, culture, and morality, or is it wrong to eat your dog? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 65(4):613-628.
- Hamilton, W. D. (1964a) The genetic evolution of social behaviour. I, *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 7:1-16.
- Hamilton, W. D. (1964b) The genetic evolution of social behaviour. II, *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 7:17-52.
- Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. (2007) Morphological rationalism and the psychology of moral judgment, *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 10(3):279-295.
- Husted, B. W. and Folger, R. (2004) Fairness and transaction costs: The contribution of organizational justice theory to an integrative model of economic organization, *Organization Science*, 15(6):719-729
- Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976) Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs, and ownership structure, *The Journal of Financial Economics*, 3:305-360.
- Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L. and Thaler, R. (1986a) Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market, *The American Economic Review*, 76(4):728-741
- Kahneman, D; Knetsch, J. L. and Thaler, R. H. (1986b) Fairness and the assumptions of economics, *The Journal of Business*, 59(4, Part 2): The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory (Oct.):285-300.
- Kant, I. (2004) *Kritik av det praktiska förnuftet*, (Critic der practischen Vernunft), Stockholm:Thales.
- Knight, F. H. (1965) *Risk, uncertainty, and profit*, New Your: Harper and Row.
- Kohlberg, L. (1973) The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of moral judgment, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 70(18): 630-646.
- Kohlberg, L. (1981) *The philosophy of moral development*, Harper & Row: San Francisco.
- Madsen, M. C. and Shapira, A. (1977) Cooperation and challenge in four cultures, *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 102:189-195.
- Mayer, D. M., Aquino, K., Greenbaum, R. L. and Kuenzi, M. (2012) Who displays ethical leadership, and why does it matter? An examination of antecedents and consequences of ethical leadership, *Academy of Management Journal*, 55(1):151-171.
- Miller, D. T. (1999) The norm of self-interest, *American Psychologist*, 54(12):1053-1060.
- Molière (1988). *Misantropen eller den förälskade furien* (Le Misanthrope ou l'Atrabilaire amoureux'), Stehag:Symposion.
- Nicklin, J. M., Greenbaum, R., McNall, L. A., Folger, R. and Williams, K. J. (2011) The importance of contextual variables when judging fairness: An examination of counterfactual thoughts and fairness theory, *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process*, 114:127-141.
- Perrow, C. (1986) *Complex organizations: a critical essay*. 3. ed. New York: McGraw-Hill

Free University of Scania, Lazy Paper Series 2020:1

- Rawls, J. (1989) *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Satow, R. L. (1975) Value-rational authority and professional organizations: Weber's missing type, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 20(4): 526-531
- Sen, A. K. (1977) Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6(4):317-344.
- Shapira, A. (1976) Developmental differences in competitive behavior of Kibbutz and city children, *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 98:19-26.
- Shapira, A. and Madsen, M. C. (1969) Cooperative and competitive behavior of Kibbutz and urban children in Israel, *Child Development*, 40(2):609-617.
- Simon, H. A. (1957) *Models of Man: Social and Rational*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
- Skarlicki, D. P. and Rupp, D. E. (2010). Dual processing and organizational justice: The role of rational versus experiential processing in third-party reactions to workplace mistreatment, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 95(5):944-952.
- Sunstein, C. R. (2005) Moral heuristics, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 28:531-573.
- Swanson, D. L. (1995) Addressing a theoretical problem by reorienting the corporate social performance model, *Academy of Management Review*, 20(1):43-65.
- Trivers, R. L. (1971) The evolution of reciprocal altruism, *Quarterly Review of Biology*. 46:35-57
- Turillo, C. J., Folger, R., Lavelle, J. J., Umphress, E. E. and Gee, J. O. (2002) Is virtue its own reward? Self-sacrificial decisions for the sake of fairness, *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 89:839-865.
- Tusa, A. A Tusa, J. (2010) *The Nuremberg Trial*, NY: Skyhorse Publishing.
- Velamuri, S. R. and Dew, N. (2009) Evolutionary processes. Moral luck, and the ethical responsibilities of the manager, *Journal of Business Ethics*, 91:113-126.
- Victor, B. and Cullen, J. B. (1988) The organizational bases of ethical work climates, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 33(1):101-125.
- Vidal, C. (2007) An enduring philosophical agenda. Worldview construction as a philosophical method. *ECCO Working Paper*, <http://cogprints.org/6048/>.
- White, M. D. (2004) Can homo economicus follow Kant's categorical imperative? *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 33: 89-106.
- Williamson, O. E. (1996) *The mechanisms of governance*, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.